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of use practically has been treated [...] almost as an 
embarrassment”. 
The institutional dynamics in ethnobiology have 
changed rather dramatically since the early 1980s. 
While ethnobiology has become less engaged with 
general debates about cognitive universality and 
cultural relativity, new research priorities have 
emerged around issues such as agroecology, climate 
change, conservation management, food security, 
knowledge rights, and political self-determination 
(Nabhan et al. 2011). Following Hunn’s (2007) 
periodization of four phases in ethnobiology, 
Wyndham et al. (2011:124) therefore envision the 
development of an “ethnobiology 5” in which “the 
field plays a heightened role in addressing the needs 
of a world coping with rapid ecological change and 
shifting political economies”. Furthermore, 
Wolverton (2013:22) specifies this idea of an 
emerging fifth phase that creates an “expansive future 
for ethnobiology [...] beyond its traditional disciplinary 
homes in anthropology and biology, moving toward 
human geography, environmental philosophy, 
political ecology, conservation biology, and related 
fields with more explicit ideological missions.”  
Introduction  
Ethnobiology is commonly defined as a 
transdisciplinary field that integrates heterogenous 
methods from biological taxonomy and cognitive 
science to political ecology and Indigenous studies. 
Despite this transdisciplinary identity (e.g., Anderson 
2012; Wolverton 2013), the current state of 
ethnobiology is far from unified as researchers tend 
to prioritize methodological perspectives along their 
heterogenous disciplinary backgrounds. In the United 
States, much of the institutionalization of 
ethnobiology coincided with the emergence of the 
cognitive sciences and was entangled with more 
general ambitions of cognitive anthropology and 
ethnoscience (Hunn 2007). Just as the “cognitive 
revolution” motivated the search for linguistic and 
psychological universals, much of American 
ethnobiology in the 1960s and 1970’s aimed for 
universals in human reasoning about the biological 
world (Ludwig 2018). In fact, the influence of these 
cognitivist concerns became so dominant that Hunn 
(1982:831) argued for a reconsideration of the 
“utilitarian factor” and suggested that “the fact that 
cultural knowledge of the natural world might also be 
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The absence of any cognitive and psychological 
research in Wolverton’s list of disciplines is not 
surprising but reflects a shift in emphasis toward 
applied and normative concerns in ethnobiology. 
Furthermore, the decisively local character of many of 
these concerns tends to motivate questions about the 
particularities of specific socio-ecological systems 
rather than questions about cross-cultural invariance 
and underlying cognitive structures. For example, 
concerns about food security of a particular 
Indigenous community will often connect more 
straightforwardly to the economics of agricultural 
intensification, the dynamics of soil degradation, and 
the politics of Indigenous self-determination rather 
than questions about the universality of the 
categorization of plants or cross-cultural invariance of 
inductive reasoning about causality.  
One consequence of this development is a 
striking absence of cognitive perspectives in many 
characterizations of the state and future of 
ethnobiology. This does not mean that cognitivist 
research on folkbiology has vanished. Although 
questions about folkbiological cognition appear 
increasingly relegated to the periphery of 
“ethnobiology 5”,  they have found a new institutional 
home in the cognitive sciences and have been 
connected to heterogenous issues from foundational 
debates about cognitive modularity (Atran and Medin 
2008) and essentialism (Gelman 2003; Sousa et al. 
2002) to their implications for issues such as 
childhood anthropocentrism (Waxman and Medin 
2007), learning about environments (Zarger 2011), or 
folk categories of race (Machery and Faucher 2005).  
For example, consider Atran and Medin’s 
influential research program that integrates 
ethnobiological concerns with debates about the 
modular structure of human cognition and the 
specific hypothesis of an innate module of 
folkbiological cognition. While their synthesizing The 
Native Mind (2008) has been widely discussed in the 
cognitive sciences (e.g., Bender and Beller 2011; 
Glushko 2008; Keil 2010; Waxman et al. 2014), there 
is a striking absence of substantial engagement in 
journals and conferences of institutionalized 
ethnobiology. Four decades after Hunn warned about 
a neglect of the “utilitarian factor” through the 
dominance of cognitivist perspectives, it has therefore 
become time to invert his warning by reconsidering 
the role of the “cognitive factor” in an ethnobiologi-
cal community that has shifted its focus increasingly 
towards applied and normative concerns.  
While some of these developments are unique to 
the ethnobiology community, they also need to be 
situated in more general dynamics of institutional 
separation that reflect conflicting ideas about the role 
of cognition in the human sciences. For example, 
shifting attitudes toward cognitive factors in 
ethnobiology are closely entangled with the changing 
relationship between anthropology and the cognitive 
sciences. While the emergence of cognitive 
ethnobiology in the United States was part of a larger 
trend towards cognitive anthropology during the 
“cognitive revolution” of the 1960s (Hunn 2007), the 
position of anthropology in the cognitive sciences has 
become increasingly precarious. For example, Beller et 
al. (2013) ask whether anthropology should be still 
considered part of cognitive science and emphasize 
that the dominance of cognitive psychology has 
marginalized field work-based methods and 
ethnographic description beyond the lab. As a result, 
Beller et al. diagnose that “anthropology is deserting, 
and is being deserted by, the other cognitive sciences 
just at the point where the role of culture is 
increasingly recognized as of prime relevance for the 
science of human cognition” (2013:343).  
While there is a story about the marginalization of 
anthropology in cognitive science, there is also an 
inverted story about the marginalization of cognitive 
perspectives in anthropology. Simultaneously to the 
institutionalization of the cognitive sciences, 
anthropology increasingly developed an identity as a 
discipline that addresses culture “not [as] an 
experimental science in search of law but [as] an 
interpretive one in search of meaning” (Geertz 
1973:5). Geertz’s influential account of “thick 
description” explicitly positioned itself in contrast to 
both ethnoscience and cognitive anthropology. As 
Hunn (2018:427) argues, “the cognitive foundations 
of culture—the heart of the cognitive anthropology of 
the 1960s and 1970s—was dismissed as ‘psychology,’ 
and thus not properly ‘cultural’ (Geertz 1973:11). The 
subsequent postmodern turn abandoned formal 
comparative empirical research—the hallmark of 
cognitive anthropology—in favor of hermeneutics.”  
Of course, there has never been a complete 
isolation of anthropology from cognitive perspectives 
with researchers from Bateson (1972) and Ingold 
(2000) to Ellen (2006) and Bloch (2012) developing 
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various integrative programs. However, there still 
remains a clear case for mutual marginalization in the 
mainstream of both disciplines that can provide 
instructive lessons for the current state of 
ethnobiology. First, ethnobiology may be on an 
analogous path of institutional separation that leaves 
cognitive and non-cognitive research increasingly 
isolated from each other. Furthermore, one may 
embrace this separation as a tense but ultimately 
necessary process of disciplinary specialization. 
Ethnobiologists share a focus on the relations 
between local communities, biota, and environments, 
but researchers from different fields have very 
different questions about these relations that demand 
equally different methods. A botanist may wonder 
whether ethnotaxa can guide the identification of new 
species with DNA barcoding methods. A political 
ecologist may wonder how agricultural intensification 
interacts with labor conditions of an Indigenous 
community. A cognitive psychologist may wonder 
whether cross-cultural comparisons of ecological 
reasoning can shed light on human adaptation to 
complexity and uncertainty. These questions can all 
guide legitimate research projects even if they 
ultimately have relatively little to contribute to each 
other. 
There are some important lessons in this case for 
disciplinary specialization and a more resolute 
pluralism about disciplinary concerns can avoid 
unproductive priority disputes between 
ethnobiologists with different disciplinary 
backgrounds. However, an entirely fragmented vision 
of ethnobiology also obscures why ethnobiology 
matters in the first place. One does not need to 
embrace a fully unified vision of ethnobiology to 
think that the field should aim for more than only the 
sum of insights from its disciplinary parts. Indeed, a 
core motivation for ethnobiological research is the 
recognition that many relevant issues can only be 
addressed through the entanglement of biological, 
cognitive, and sociocultural factors that remain 
isolated in more narrow disciplinary research. 
Dynamics of “biocultural” (Wyndham et al. 2011) or 
“socio-ecological” (Hidayati et al. 2015) systems can 
only be understood if the causal interaction of highly 
heterogeneous factors such as soil chemistry, spiritual 
beliefs, economic pressures, plant categories, 
deforestation, agricultural practices, ecological 
reasoning, and migration patterns are taken into 
account. 
If such a systemic perspective on the interaction 
between biological, cognitive, and sociocultural 
factors is a core task of ethnobiology, an isolation of 
cognitive perspectives from the applied and normative 
concerns of “ethnobiology 5” runs the risk of 
undermining the raison d'être of ethnobiology through 
disciplinary fragmentation. And indeed, there is an 
alternative way of thinking about the role of cognition 
in ethnobiology that recognizes the value of 
disciplinary specialization but also the relevance of 
investigating the entanglement of cognitive factors 
and wider dynamics in socio-ecological systems. A 
systemic perspective on causal interactions between 
biological, cognitive, and sociocultural factors 
provides opportunities for more integrative research 
but also comes with challenges for researchers with 
different disciplinary perspectives. First, there is the 
challenge of overcoming stereotypes of cognitive 
science as antagonistic to applied and normative 
concerns about local socio-ecological dynamics. A 
sufficiently rich understanding of such dynamics 
requires attention to the causal roles of cognitive 
factors through categorization, reasoning, and 
perception that often remain neglected because of 
disinterest or even hostility towards cognitive 
perspectives in discourses of cultural anthropology 
and social sciences.   
At the same time, such an integration also 
requires that cognitive scientists take the systemic 
character of multi-directional causal interactions 
seriously rather than focusing on the priority of 
cognitive factors as the foundation upon which 
sociocultural diversity is built. Of course, there are 
plenty of cases in which cognitive factors ground 
sociocultural phenomena just as there are cases in 
which sociocultural factors shape cognitive 
phenomena. However, there are clear limitations of 
cognitivist programs that think of themselves 
primarily as providing the universal foundations upon 
which cultural diversity is built. First, negotiations of 
priority encourage ideological (e.g., “cognitivist” vs. 
“culturalist”) confrontations about the relation 
between disciplines and methodologies. If the 
interaction between biological, cognitive, and 
sociocultural factors is approached through questions 
of priority, there is little hope that the heterogeneous 
community of ethnobiologists can find a common 
starting point. 
Second, priority questions often obscure the 
reciprocal character of causal interactions in socio-
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ecological systems that can be empirically explored 
without settling general disputes about cognitivist and 
culturalist programs. While it is true that many 
prominent cognitivist approaches develop ambitious 
foundational programs from Berlin et al.’s (1973) 
general principles of classification to Atran and 
Medin’s (2008) biological module of the mind, many 
of their insights can be appreciated without 
commitment to their entire theoretical frameworks 
and without getting stuck in general controversies 
about the merits of universalism and relativism. For 
example, substantial parts of Atran and Medin’s work 
(e.g., on devolution of biological knowledge, about 
inductive reasoning, or about folkecology) provide 
important lessons for ethnobiologists no matter 
where they stand in ongoing controversies about the 
“modularity of mind” (Barrett 2105). Rival (2018:428) 
is therefore entirely right to emphasize that “Atran’s 
and Medin’s highly original programme” deserves 
more attention in ethnobiology because it is 
concerned “with the pragmatics of reasoning in the 
fire of social action.”  
To illustrate this point, consider Atran and 
Medin’s (2008) folkecological research on cognitive 
strategies in agroforestry regimes in the Guatemalan 
lowlands of El Petén. Addressing cognitive and 
sociocultural factors in agroforestry practices of three 
communities (native Itza’ Maya, Spanish-speaking 
immigrant Ladinos, and immigrant Q’eqchi’ Maya), 
Atran and Medin develop a complex picture of the 
relation between biological, cognitive, and 
sociocultural factors. Given rapid deforestation in El 
Petén, one of their core findings is that native Itza’ 
Maya practiced sustainable agroforestry while 
immigrant Q’eqchi’ Maya practices were largely 
insensitive to the long-term survival of the lowland 
forest. Cognitive factors come into play as a partial 
explanans for these differences as Itza’ and Q’eqchi’ 
employed different mental models with equally 
different assumptions about the relationship between 
animals, plants, and humans. For example, there were 
not only substantial quantitative but also qualitative 
differences in Itza’ and Q’eqchi’ reasoning about 
ecological relations between animals and plants. While 
Q’eqchi’ understood these relations as unidirectional 
with plants providing food for animals, Itza’ 
emphasized their reciprocal character with animals 
affecting plants in multiple ways such as seed 
dispersal and fertilization.  
While cognitive factors contribute to the 
explanation of Itza’ and Q’eqchi’ agroforestry, they 
can themselves be partly explained in terms of 
different sociocultural practices. Atran and Medin 
found that Itza’ culture emphasizes and strongly 
values expertise about the forest in a way that 
“information about the forest appears integrally 
bound to intimate patterns of social life as well as to 
an experiential history traceable over many 
generations” (2008:212). In the context of Q’eqchi’ 
communities, Atran and Medin did not find similar 
sociocultural patterns and they argue that “continued 
corporate and ceremonial ties to the sacred mountain 
valleys of the Q’eqchi’ highlands do not imply a 
corresponding respect for lowland ecolo-
gy” (2008:212). In other words, their comparative 
study not only addresses the role of cognitive factors 
in affecting ecological phenomena but also accounts 
for the role of sociocultural factors in affecting 
cognitive phenomena. Furthermore, these 
sociocultural factors are themselves not brute facts 
but can be related back to factors such as the 
adaptation of Itza’ and Q’eqchi’ cultures to their 
native lowland and highland environments.  
Several lessons can be drawn from this short 
example. First, cognitive factors matter for applied 
and normative concerns about local environments and 
livelihoods that drive “ethnobiology 5”. Differences in 
mental models and ecological reasoning guided Itza’ 
and Q’eqchi’ interactions with the forest and a neglect 
of these factors obscures important causal factors for 
understanding agroforestry practices. Indeed, this 
point is not restricted to Atran and Medin’s work in 
Guatemala but has emerged from many other studies 
on folkbiological categories. For example, Medin et 
al.’s (2006) study of the folkbiology of freshwater fish 
starts with traditional concerns in cognitive 
ethnobiology about category formation but explores 
how differences in categorization of fish interact with 
ecological expertise. Furthermore, one can find similar 
lessons in other areas of research including 
Berkes’ (2018) classical articulation of “Traditional 
Ecological Knowledge” that is highly sensitive to how 
local categories—including the infamous “Eskimo 
word for snow”—can function as repositories of 
ecological knowledge. Finally, consider Anderson’s 
(1996) discussion of feng-shui as an “ecology of the 
heart” that relies on the interaction between cognitive 
and emotional factors in co-producing Chinese 
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practices of landscape planning through aesthetic 
perception and care. All of these studies share the 
basic insight that investigation into cognitive factors 
such as categorization, perception, and reasoning is 
often of crucial relevance for understanding applied 
issues such as sustainable hunting, farming, and 
fishing practices. A general neglect of cognitive 
factors would therefore not advance but rather 
obstruct the applied and normative agendas of 
“ethnobiology 5”.  
A second lesson from Atran and Medin’s case 
study is the importance of a systemic perspective on 
mutual influences and causal feedback loops rather 
than linear priority ordering. In the case of Itza’ and 
Q’eqchi’ agroforestry, for example, cognitive and 
ecological factors can both be cause and effect for 
each other. On the one hand, Atran and Medin’s 
analysis of mental models addresses how cognitive 
factors guide local interventions in ecosystems. On 
the other hand, differences in mental models are not 
only causes but also effects of ecological phenomena 
as Itza’ and Q’eqchi’ reasoning has been shaped by 
their native lowland and highland environments. 
Similar cases for mutual influence can be made with 
regard to sociocultural factors such as Itza’ accounts 
of forest spirits that shape agroforestry practices but 
can also be described as being shaped by cognitive 
and ecological factors such as the pressure to adapt a 
sustainable use of forest resources (see also 
Albuquerque et al. 2015). Understanding of Itza’ and 
Q’eqchi’ agroforestry therefore requires modeling of a 
complex system of interacting causal factors rather 
than linear ordering of causal factors through 
cognitive foundations of sociocultural phenomena (or 
vice versa). 
Third, many of these dynamics can be empirically 
investigated without requiring prior agreement about 
foundational controversies about issues such as 
cognitive universals and cultural relativism. For 
example, much of Atran and Medin’s analysis of Itza’ 
and Q’eqchi’ reasoning can be appreciated without 
agreement on their general nativist framework of 
modularity of mind. The applied and normative 
concerns of ethnobiology 5 often require close 
attention to cognitive factors but much of the relevant 
evidence about local categorization, reasoning, and 
perception can be integrated in different theoretical 
frameworks. Of course, this does not mean that these 
theoretical frameworks are without practical relevance 
and foundational assumptions about cognitive 
universals and cultural relativity will clearly affect 
modeling of causal pathways between interacting 
factors. However, it is simply a mistake to assume that 
no progress can be made until everyone agrees on 
these issues.  
This short perspective article has argued that we 
need a new conversation about cognition in 
ethnobiology that challenges the increasing 
institutional separation between cognitive perspectives 
on folkbiology and normative concerns of 
“ethnobiology 5”. By proposing a systemic 
perspective that focuses on multi-directional causal 
interactions, the article sketched an alternative to 
priority disputes about the relation between biological, 
cognitive, and sociocultural factors. Such an 
integrative perspective can lead not only to more 
adequate models of socio-ecological dynamics but also 
provide opportunities for better connecting 
ethnobiology with the state of both cognitive sciences 
and anthropology.  
Current developments in the cognitive sciences 
can provide ethnobiologists with fruitful theoretical 
resources as illustrated by the increased prominence 
of research on cognitive diversity across cultures 
(Bender and Beller 2016; Henrich et al. 2010) and 
extensive debates about embodied, embedded, and 
situated cognition (Shapiro 2014). This literature 
demonstrates that the current state of the cognitive 
sciences has much more to offer to current 
ethnobiology than a continuation of tired 
controversies about universalism vs. relativism. 
Instead, a vast body of empirical research has come to 
focus on cognitive processes within local contexts and 
provides currently underexplored resources for 
addressing cognitive factors in socio-ecological 
dynamics as well as their implications for issues such 
as agricultural and conservation practices in 
ethnobiology. 
Further impulses for a novel conversation about 
cognition can be found in anthropological theory. For 
example, Ingold (2000:167) has emphasized the 
practical significance of cognitive factors and argued 
for the need to “re-embed perception and cognition 
within the practical contexts of people’s ongoing 
engagement with their environments in the ordinary 
course of life.” While such a practice-oriented 
perspective on cognition is rarely explored in 
ethnobiology (interesting exceptions include Rival 
2014;  Villagómez-Reséndiz 2017), it provides 
resources for bridging overly abstract cognitivist 
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approaches and theoretically underdeveloped 
discussions in applied ethnobiology. Furthermore, 
following Ingold’s practice-oriented focus on 
cognition also provides a novel angle for connecting 
ethnobiological research to current controversies 
about the “ontological turn” (see also Daly et al. 2016; 
Ludwig 2016) that engage with issues such as the 
boundaries of cognition in animist perspectives 
(Descola 2013, Kohn 2013, Viveiros de Castro 2012). 
To sum up, a reconsideration of cognitive factors 
does not undermine the applied and normative 
concerns of “ethnobiology 5”. On the contrary, a 
novel conversation about cognition can provide 
ethnobiologists with crucial resources for 
understanding socio-ecological dynamics and for 
integrating their research with wider debates from 
“situated cognition” to the “ontological turn”.  
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